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ABSTRACT
WILLIAM COLMER AND THE POLITICS OF NEW DEAL

LABOR LEGISLATION 1933-1940
by Zachary Wyatt Moulds
May 2012
William (Bill) Colmer first entered Congress in 1933, the same year that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal began to reshape the role of
government in the United States. While the New Deal's efforts to combat the
Great Depression proved popular in the beginning, by 1935 many congressmen,
especially southerners, began to distance themselves from the administration's
attempts at social reform. Although many of his colleagues refused to endorse
the increasingly liberal agenda of the New Deal, Congressman Colmer remained
loyal throughout the decade. His loyalty to the administration was due in part to
the south Mississippi district he represented. District Six was Mississippi's
melting pot and contained the largest labor force and the most diverse industries
in the state. Also, the presence of organized labor set District Six apart from
other Mississippi congressional districts. While the conservatism of Colmer's
later career has been well documented, his earliest years in Congress have not.
This thesis will focus on the liberal Bill Colmer, and his record regarding labor
legislation helps measure and explain his New Deal liberalism .
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 1942, American Federation of Labor President, William Green,
sent prominent Hattiesburg barber and newly elected Mississippi State
Federation of Labor President W . L. (Willie) Hines a puzzling telegram. In the
derisive letter, Green condemned the voting record of Congressman William M.
Colmer, a Pascagoula Democrat, regarding wartime labor legislation. He urged
Hines to support Judge Ben Stevens of Richton, Colmer's opponent for
Mississippi's Sixth Congressional District seat, in the following month's primary.
"I consider the record he has made as very bad. It was very unsatisfactory to
labor," Green contended. Colmer learned of the letter later the same week, and
its contents symbolized a bitter, and more remarkably, a curious pill to swallow.
Since entering Congress in 1933, Colmer's support for President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal, especially the labor legislation, had been equaled by few
representatives from the South and none from Mississippi.

1

In his first years in Washington, Bill Colmer participated in a legislative
onslaught unrivaled by any Congress in memory. In the spring of 1933,
President Roosevelt's New Deal began, taking rein of a nation mired in a deep
economic depression. By decade's end, the administration had changed almost
every preconceived notion regarding the relationship of government and
America's private sector. The New Deal created a template for future

1

William Green to W.l. Hines, July 22, 1942, in William M . Colmer Papers, McCain Library,
University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg.
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administrations and forever cemented ties between the federal government and
the American people. Colmer would be along for the entire, bumpy ride.2
After being sworn in, the president declared a national bank holiday and
called a special session of Congress. Initially, the lone legislative priority was a
sweeping emergency bank bill, which passed the lower House, sight unseen,
with what William Leuchtenburg deemed "a unanimous shout," after less than an
hour of debate. The bill was introduced, approved by both houses, and signed
by Roosevelt within eight hours. The Seventy-third Congress had commenced.3
Roosevelt's original plan was to secure the banking legislation and then
adjourn Congress, but members of the Brain Trust, the president's closest
advisors, encouraged him to extend the session. The momentum produced by
the Emergency Banking Act seemed too precious to waste, and Roosevelt and
his advisors, concluding correctly that the length and severity of the Depression
had rendered Congress extraordinarily malleable, embarked on an ambitious
legislative course.4
What followed, famously remembered as the Hundred Days, was
politically unprecedented. In just over three months, the Seventy-third Congress
passed a broad range of relief and recovery measures aimed at alleviating the
Depression. The relief efforts met with immediate enthusiasm. For young,
unmarried men, the Civilian Conservation Corps provided work developing the

2

Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 {New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 1989), 1-3.
3
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper
and Row, 1963), 43-44; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), 8.
4
Schlesinger, Jr., 8-23.
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country's natural resources. The Federal Emergency Relief Act provided both
work and direct relief to the unemployed and destitute. Creating mostly unskilled
positions, FERA quickly sent men and women back into the workforce. The
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act and the Home Owners' Loan Act enabled many
to refinance their farms and homes in order to save them. With roots dating back
to the Woodrow Wilson administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act
created a regional planning agency that provided, among other things, cheap
electricity and comprehensive economic development for much of the South,
including Mississippi. Although TVA did not provide direct relief, it proved to be
a popular agency throughout the New Deal. 5
The two primary recovery efforts of the Hundred Days focused on
agriculture and industry. To combat plummeting crop prices, Congress passed
the Agricultural Adjustment Act designed to increase the prices of staple crops by
paying farmers to restrict production. For industry, there was the National
Industrial Recovery Act, which sought to stabilize industry under codes of fair
competition developed through government-business cooperation. The codes
were drafted primarily by deputy administrators under Roosevelt and members of
three National Recovery Administration advisory boards representing business,
labor, and consumers. The NIRA also guaranteed the rights of organized labor
and appropriated over three billion dollars to be spent on public works. 6

5

Ibid., 20-27; Donald M. Dana, Jr. and Chester Morgan, A Priceless Heritage: The Story of the
Mississippi Power Company (Gulfport, MS: The Mississippi Power Company, 1993), 58.
6
William Lincoln Giles, "Agricultural Revolution, 1890-1970," in A History of Mississippi, Richard
Aubrey Mclemore, ed. (Hattiesburg, MS: University and College Press of M ississippi, 1973), II, 202;
Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 37-38.

4

In total, Roosevelt delivered and Congress passed fifteen major pieces of
legislation. In some measure, everything enacted during the Hundred Days
would remain vital throughout the New Deal. The legislation, along with
Roosevelt's immense popularity, provided a major source of hope for Americans,
and the cloud of fear cast over the nation by the Depression began to give way to
rays of optimism. "Roosevelt is an explorer," said Winston Churchill, ''who has
embarked on a voyage as uncertain as that of Columbus, and upon a quest
7

which might conceivably be as important as the discovery of the New World."
After the Hundred Days euphoria had subsided, however, Roosevelt's
policies, though still popular with many Americans, began to encounter

opposition, especially among businessmen. Despite sweeping Democratic gains
in the 1934 elections, the United States Chamber of Commerce formally
condemned the New Deal early the following year. The "thunder on the right," as
termed by James MacGregor Burns, attacked the New Deal and its intrusive
business legislation. Meanwhile equally thunderous interests on the left called
for more drastic measures. Prominent figures such as Louisiana Senator Huey
Long and Michigan's Father Charles Coughlin, a famous radio personality,
demanded that the New Deal enact more liberal social and economic reforms.
The dissent among the New Dealers forced the president into action. The result
of Roosevelt's renewed vitality was manifest in the Second Hundred Days.

7

8

Schlesinger, Jr., 23.
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1956), 227; Chester M . Morgan, Redneck Liberal: Theodore G. Bilbo and the New Deal (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 69-70.
8

5

Aside from the political jabs coming from liberals and conservatives, the
most significant catalyst leading to Congress' flurry of legislation was the
Supreme Court's invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act. With his
industrial recovery program nullified and continued business support for the New
Deal unlikely, an angry Roosevelt embarked on a bold course. The actions of
the Court prompted the president to keep Congress in session throughout the
summer of 1935. Along with a new and more thorough labor bill in the Wagner
Act, the Second Hundred Days Congress passed social security, banking, and
public-utilities legislation. The results were bittersweet for Roosevelt; although
Congress passed legislation which would be remembered as the administration's
most triumphant, the Second Hundred Days left many of his conservative
supporters questioning the course of the New Deal.

9

From 1936 to 1938, the New Deal was often at an impasse. The
administration's support on Capitol Hill had weakened, despite Roosevelt's
monumental defeat of Alf Landon in the 1936 election. Controversial legislation
and a botched court-packing proposal in 1937 left many former New Dealers
alienated. Apprehension among conservatives had now coalesced into a semiformal coalition often at odds with the president's agenda. By decade's end, the
strength of the conservative coalition and affairs abroad forced the Roosevelt
administration to modify its course domestically. The Fair Labor Standards Act of

9

Leuchtenburg, 150.

6

1938, although a landmark piece of labor legislation, would mark the effective
end of the New Deal.

10

By that time, Colmer had represented Mississippi's Sixth Congressional
district for nearly a decade, at times running counter to many of his more
conservative southern colleagues in the lower House. Throughout the twists and
turns of Roosevelt's sweeping reform program, Colmer remained loyal, as
thorough a New Dealer as Mississippi would produce. Between 1937 and 1940,
Colmer supported the president on eight of el.even key roll call votes (nearly 73
percent), far more than Congressman John Rankin, whose support for the
administration fell below 50 percent, the next highest percentage among the
Mississippi delegation. Colmer remained the only Mississippi representative not
labeled a conservative in James T. Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and
the New Deal, and his voting record on labor legislation was unrivaled among
Mississippi's House delegation. Despite this, the AFL's William Green remained
unimpressed.

11

The 1942 falling out with Green marked a turning point in Colmer's
political career. By the coming of World War II, Colmer had begun a transition
that would take him from New Deal liberal to arch conservative. While the
conservatism of his later career is well documented, Colmer's work throughout
the Great Depression is not. This thesis will focus on Bill Colmer, the liberal New
Dealer.
10

James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington : University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 164-66.
11
Philip A. Grant, Jr., "The Mississippi Congressional Delegation and the Formation of the
Conservative Coalition, 1937- 1940," Journal of Mississippi History 50 (February 1988): 21-28; Patterson,
339-45.

7

Colmer was born in Moss Point, Mississippi, in 1890, the son of a sawmill
worker. He was educated in Gulfport's public schools and worked in the local
lumber mills as a young man. After attending Millsaps College in Jackson, he
returned to south Mississippi in 1914 and taught for three years in Lumberton,
where he met his wife, Ruth Milner. In 1917, he gained admittance to the
Mississippi bar and began practicing law. His nascent legal career would be put
on hold as he enlisted in World War I. Coming home to Pascagoula after the
war, Colmer returned to his law practice.

12

In 1928, Colmer began his political career. That year, the married father
of three was elected Jackson County District Attorney, a position he held for four
years. At forty-two he first won election to the House of Representatives in 1932.
Although Bill Colmer in 1932 would prove to be a fundamentally different
politician than Bill Colmer in 1972, the year he chose to retire and return home to
Pascagoula, he arrived in Washington an enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt.
Colmer quickly proved himself as a valuable New Dealer. Alone among
Mississippi's delegates in the lower House, he supported every piece of the
Hundred Days legislation.

13

By 1933, many Mississippians were destitute. In September 1933, FERA
Field Representative Aubrey Williams reported to his boss Harry Hopkins, "The
situation in Mississippi continues to be a rather desperate one." The severity of
Mississippi's economic crisis was apparent to those outside of the federal

12

Neil Michael Bruce Rowe, "William M. Colmer: His Role as a Leader in the House of
Representatives" (honor's thesis, University of Southern Mississippi, 1989), 6-7.
13
Roger D. Tate, "Easing the Burden : The Era of Depression and New Deal in Mississippi" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1978), 56.

8

government as well. In 1931, renowned journalist H.L. Mencken labeled
Mississippi "the worst American state." Mencken's conclusions were based on
statistics and analysis which focused on various facets of Mississippi's social,
economic, and political culture. Unfortunately, Mencken's analysis was quite
accurate. 14
The factors contributing to Mencken's inglorious title predated the stock
market crash of 1929. The state's woeful economic conditions were rooted in,
among other things, a debilitating one-crop agricultural policy and a legacy of
Populist-Progressive era hostility to industrialization. For decades prior to the
Depression, Mississippi's Populist and Progressive politicians passed regulatory
legislation discouraging out-of-state investors, thus enabling cotton to retain its
disproportionate role in the economy. Simultaneously, the legislation reinforced
cycles of debt for poor farmers, stifled purchasing power, although consumerism
was fast becoming the national pastime, and deterred economic growth. The
results of these legislative actions, or arguable inactions, ultimately limited
employment opportunities for Mississippi's labor force. 15
Though agriculture was important within District Six, King Cotton did not
reign supreme among Colmer's constituency. The sixteen counties Colmer

14

Aubrey Williams to Harry Hopkins, September 13, 1933, in Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Fran klin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park; Tate, 3-5.
15
Westley F. Busbee, Jr., Mississippi: A History (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2005), 212-24;
John Ray Skates, Mississippi: A Bicentennial History (New York: W . W . Norton Company, 1979 ), 120-35;
Ted Ownby, American Dreams in M ississippi: Consumers, Poverty, and Cult ure, 1830-1998 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 95.
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served represented the most diverse congressional district in the state.

16

Counties such as Covington and Jefferson Davis were rural and in 1933-34
received the most federal money in within the district according to the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration's Cotton Division director Cully Cobb, a trend that
would continue throughout the lifespan of the AAA. The interests of the coastal
counties, however, were much less aligned to Mississippi's cotton culture.
Compared to the rest of the district, the coast counties were more diverse, with
an abundance of population, industrial opportunities, and a large labor force, not
to mention the bountiful Gulf of Mexico as their southern border. Other District
Six counties were mixed, containing both industrial and agrarian elements. 17
By Mississippi standards, District Six was urban. To imply that the
calamity within the agricultural markets evaded Colmer's district would be
incorrect; the Piney Woods and Coastal Pine Meadow regions that make up
District Six sustained farms and provided rural Mississippians an income.
Throughout the New Deal, Colmer received countless letters from within the
district regarding AAA checks and farming subsidies. However, District Six
differed from Wall Doxey's District Two, which was littered with acres and acres
of North Mississippi cotton. Nor was it akin to District Three, represented by
Greenwood Congressman Will Whittington, located in the center of Mississippi's
Alluvial Plains and teeming with plantations, unlike the smaller farms of District
Six. Colmer's district contained lumbermen, railroad men, textile workers,

16

District Six was comprised of the following counties: Covington, Forrest, George, Greene,
Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Lawrence, Marion, Pearl River, Perry, Stone,
and Wayne.
17
C.A. Cobb to Colmer, June 14, 1934, in Colmer Papers.
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fishermen , seafood factory workers, ship builders, farmers, and white collar
professionals, among others.
Due to the diversity of the district and its percentage of industry and
population, New Deal labor legislation provides an effective vehicle for studying
Colmer's early years in Washington. His acumen in supporting labor legislation
during the Depression, while many of his colleagues in the lower House did not,
endeared him to voters, labor leaders, and the Roosevelt administration. District
Six was Mississippi's melting pot, forcing the congressman to juggle the needs of
his diverse constituents, amidst the torrents of New Deal legislation flooding
Washington, and Colmer's record regarding organized labor thus helps measure
and explain his New Deal liberalism.
The New Deal provided a framework for developing organized labor, but
unionists already had roots in Mississippi, mostly in the southern half of the state.
Organized labor in South Mississippi pre-dated Franklin Roosevelt's
administration by over fifty years. Organizations such as the Knights of Labor,
various farmers' and railroad unions, and the American Federation of Labor, in its
earliest phase, maintained unions in Mississippi during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The New Deal would strengthen and encourage the
union sentiments in the state.

18

Initial union activity in south Mississippi concentrated primarily in the
railroad and lumber industries. The Knights of Labor, emerging in Mississippi's
post-Civil War years, flourished in the lumber mills and represented the first .

18

Donald Crumpton Mosley, "A History of Labor Unions in Mississippi" (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Alabama, 1965), 32-52.

11

official band of organized, nonagricultural labor the state had known. The
Knights national organization, at its height, numbered approximately 700,000
members. By 1888, thirty three locals operated within Mississippi. According to
Donald Mosley, the Knights' most significant achievements occurred within the
Gulf Coast's lumber industry. In the years following the Civil War, the once small
and paternalistic South Mississippi sawmills became inundated with northern
demands for lumber. Within a decade, mills became much larger, paternalistic
ties deteriorated, and, to the alarm of many Mississippians, northerners relocated
to the South and claimed many of the mills' management positions.19
By 1889, the Jackson County Knights were some of the most prominent
unionists in the state, but ineffective strikes, an influx of imported workers, and a
lack of sympathy from local law enforcement severely curbed their influence.
Although Mississippi produced more lumber than most states, ranking as high as
third in production by 1908, the unions' attempts to organize workers achieved
only modest success. Mills cooperated with each other to deter unionization. By
the turn of the century, an employer favorite, the yellow-dog contract, emerged,
forcing employees to waive their right to organize for the duration of their
employment. The Knights of Labor, both nationally and in Mississippi, had been
largely defeated.20
Although the Knights could not maintain lasting success, their influence
carried on. South Mississippi's laboring men became aware of the concept of

19

Ibid ., 37-38; James E. Fickle, The New South and the "New Competition" : Trade Association
Development in the Southern Pine Industry (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1980), 3.
20
Mosley, 42; John K. Bettersworth, M ississippi: A History (Austin, TX: The Steck Company
Publishers, 1959), 350.
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organizing, and the idea expanded significantly. Railroad unions became
popular and constituted labor's first permanent gains within the state. Building
trades' locals consisting of painters, bricklayers, and electrical workers emerged
in the heavier populated towns. Fishermen and shrimpers joined unions and
participated in strikes long before they received the support of a sympathetic
federal government. Craft unionism, exemplified most prominently by the
American Federation of Labor and its subsidiary the Mississippi Federation of
Labor, was burgeoning by the onset of the New Deal. The MFL's Holt Ross
forwent a successful law practice in Laurel to champion the rights of organized
labor fulltime in the state, long before catchphrases like ''Wagner Act'' or "wages
and hours bill'' gained fame at the national level. Fittingly, all of this occurred in
Bill Colmer's Sixth District.

21

Mosley lists several factors that explain union growth in South Mississippi
and the lack of organized labor in other parts of the state. He credits speedier
commercial growth within the southern towns as being a catalyst to organized
labor, while the heavily agrarian northern part of the state maintained relatively
sluggish commercial growth. Also, the southern half of the state contained more
railroad hubs and lumber mills. The lingering heritage of the Knights of Labor, a
large pro-labor Catholic population along the Gulf Coast and in the river towns,
and industry created by the Gulf of Mexico also contributed to higher success
rates for organized labor in South Mississippi.

21

22

Mosley, 53-92; Deanne Nuwer, "The Biloxi Fishermen Are Killing the Goose that Laid the
Golden Egg: The Seafood Strike of 1932," Journal of Mississippi History 66 (Winter 2004): 335-44.
22
Mosley, 67.
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The presence of organized labor within Bill Colmer's Sixth District seems
clear; however its existence did not guarantee success. Mosley provides a
framework for what conditions need to exist to sustain organized labor within a
specific region . A framework for labor harmony remains an entirely different
matter. As mill workers, mill owners, fisherman, seafood factory workers,
barbers, bankers, painters, and politicians would all attest during the New Deal,
different people held very different views towards labor unions and their
representatives. As it had for a half century prior, organized labor during the
1930s remained a polarizing issue.
For Colmer, questions regarding labor legislation continued throughout his
forty years in Washington. He always proclaimed himself a friend to organized
labor, and as a Gulf Coast resident, labor issues remained perpetually at hand.
As a young man, Bill Colmer earned money in Jackson County lumber mills
before going to college. Having been born in 1890, around the same time the
Knights of Labor thrived in his hometown, Colmer had to have a keen sense of
what the right to organize and bargain collectively meant to his constituents. Like
other southern states, Mississippi has been perceived as generally unsupportive
of organized labor, but Colmer's congressional career contradicts such an
oversimplified characterization. His career also illustrates why, despite landmark
legislation during the New Deal, unionism essentially failed in Mississippi. By the
time Colmer left the House in 1972, the AFL and CIO had long since merged,
and organized labor had become a powerful interest group throughout the nation.
However, when Colmer entered Congress in March of 1933, the verdict was still

14

out regarding the fate of organized labor. Bill Colmer would have a hand in
determining that fate.

15

CHAPTER II
LABOR AND BUSINESS IN THE EARLY NEW DEAL, 1933-1935
As the booming nineteen twenties shifted into the depressed nineteen
thirties, Mississippi teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. In the four years of
Herbert Hoover's presidency, Mississippi lost roughly 34,000 industrial jobs.
Unemployment in Gulfport and Biloxi surpassed ten percent, and in District Six's
upper counties, unemployment rose steadily because of stagnation in the lumber
industry. The end of Herbert Hoover's presidency aroused hope for many
Mississippians. Disdain for Hoover and his administration's perceived laissezfaire recovery efforts resonated among the voters, and the national election of
1932 confirmed that many Americans were ready for a new plan of attack to
combat the Depression.

1

Hoover's administration, however, did attempt to aid impoverished
Mississippians through federal channels. Although President Hoover proved
painfully slow at supplying federal aid, by early 1933, the Federal Farm Board
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, both Hoover administration
creations, had pumped over $8,000,000 in loans into various Mississippi relief
efforts. Although Hoover's attempts to aid the state proved too little, too late in
garnering him political support, the federal funds created enough purchasing
power for Mississippians to balance the state's budget in 1933, thanks largely to

1

Roger D. Tate, "Easing the Burden: The Era of Depression and New Deal in Mississippi" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1978), 37-41.
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the revenues generated from the recently implemented state sales tax. The
emergence of large-scale federal aid was only beginning, however.

2

President Roosevelt's arrival in Washington began with a bang, setting off
an onslaught of legislation intended to alleviate the Depression. Summoning a
special session of Congress immediately that would last until mid-June,
Roosevelt received unprecedented support in both Houses. The legislators
proved swift and generous in granting the new leader power. Excluding the
Cullen-Harrison Act, commonly referred to as the Beer Bill, Mississippi's
delegates in Congress backed Roosevelt at an average of 75 percent in the initial
session. Senator Pat Harrison and Congressman Colmer supported every piece
of legislation. The Hundred Days Congress addressed an array of national
grievances; at the president's request, the Congress repealed prohibition, passed
legislation regarding the banking crisis and agricultural surpluses, slashed federal
salaries, created relief programs, attempted to induce industrial recovery, and,
unbeknownst at the time, laid a blueprint for the evolution of organized labor.3
In the second half of the Hundred Days, industrial recovery became a top
priority for Congress. Legislation aimed at combating the widespread
unemployment emerged, the most prominent being the thirty-hour week bill
championed by Alabama Senator Hugo Black. Black's bill prohibited goods
produced in plants where employees worked in excess of a thirty-hour week from
interstate commerce. By modifying the traditional work schedules in factories
and plants, the bill would have enabled many unemployed to rejoin the labor
2

Ibid., 59-64.
Ibid., 56; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 3-6.
3

17

force. Senator Black insisted that his bill would create roughly six million much
needed jobs, yet Roosevelt remained hesitant. Roosevelt worried that the bill,
aside from being unconstitutional, would prove unfeasible in rural and agrarian
regions.

4

In Mississippi's Sixth Congressional District, opinions varied regarding the
proposed Black Bill. While Laurel's Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and
Gulfport's Brotherhood of Railway and Steamshipclerks urged Congressman
Colmer to support the thirty-hour bill, local industrial leaders such as J. I.
Thompson, manager of Hattiesburg's J.J. Newman Lumber Company, declared
the legislation unworkable within their industries. While acknowledging that the
thirty-hour week might grant relief, albeit temporary, to industries in major cities,
Thompson maintained that in the much less mechanized South, the legislation
would handicap local industry. Other prominent South Mississippi business
leaders, such as Frank Tatum of Tatum Lumber Company and J.H. Thickens of
the Masonite Corporation, agreed. Colmer conceded that although the thirtyhour bill had merit, the final version would need considerable amending in order
5

to benefit local industry.

Roosevelt also wanted industrial recovery legislation but not the kind Hugo
Black was selling. Substantial congressional support for the thirty-hour
legislation eventually forced the president's hand. Roosevelt assigned various
New Dealers the job of drafting proposals to circumvent the Black Bill.
4

David M . Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The Ameri~an People in Depression and War, 19291945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150-51.
5
R.A. Mcleod to Colmer, April 26, 1933; J.I. Thompson to Colmer, April 12, 1933; Colmer to V.A.
Scanlon, April 29, 1933, all in William M. Colmer Papers, McCain Library, University of Southern
Mississippi, Hattiesburg.
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Throughout April, allies such as Rexford Tugwell and Labor Secretary Frances
Perkins, as well as Senators Robert La Follette and Robert Wagner, zealously
began composing alternative legislation. The fruits of their labor appeared in
Roosevelt's address to Congress in mid-May, in which he introduced his plan for
a National Industrial Recovery Act.

6

The National Industrial Recovery Act included three major elements. The
first created the National Recovery Administration led by General Hugh Johnson,
which encouraged a partnership between government and business through a
series of fair competition codes. The codes were drafted by three advisory
boards representing business, labor, and consumers, as well as deputy
administrators under Roosevelt. For limiting wage decreases and excessive
layoffs and adhering to the codes of fair competition, business would be
rewarded with exemptions from anti-trust prosecution and with increased federal
spending intended to prime the proverbial pump. Businesses agreeing to
implement the codes were encouraged to display the NRA's Blue Eagle emblem ,
a minor reward for their compliance. The second significant component of the
NIRA was Title I Section 7(a) which provided industrial employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively, viewed as a landmark goal for laborers at the
time. Section 7(a) also outlawed the infamous yellow-dog contract, a long time
grievance among Mississippi's workers. The final significant piece of the bill
created the popular Public Works Administration, a federal agency meant to carry

6

Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 1989), 74; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963), 56.
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out extensive construction projects. The PWA would eventually complete many
lasting projects and spend millions of dollars throughout Colmer's district.

7

For Mississippians, The NRA's Blue Eagle campaign began mid-summer.
Chambers of Commerce throughout the state agreed to follow the codes handed
down from Washington. As soon as the first NRA codes were enacted nationally
in August, Mississippi post offices issued businesses the popular Blue Eagle
signs. To encourage accountability, newspapers promised to publish Blue Eagle
honor rolls, and NRA committees solicited pledges from citizens to support only
Blue Eagle shops. As numerous parades, marching bands, and baton twirlers
confirmed, Mississippians enthusiastically embraced the NRA.

8

The NRA intended to improve poor working conditions in Mississippi, but
by the end of 1933, optimism for the Blue Eagle campaign turned into
uncertainty. Union activity on the Coast escalated during the Depression years,
and Colmer became the recipient of anxious letters from workers expressing
frustration with the NRA. While NRA public relations parades rolled throughout
the state advocating change, women and children battled adverse conditions in
the seafood canning and packing plants. In August 1933, women in the Biloxi
packing houses struck for higher wages only to be denied. That same month,
shrimpers along the Coast, some of whom had gone on strike the previous year,

7

Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 37-38;
Kennedy, 151; Tate, 67; J. Wayne Flynt, "The New Deal and Southern Labor," in The New Deal and the
South, James C. Cobb and Michael V. Namorato, eds. (Jackson : University Press of Mississippi, 1984), 65.
8
Tate, 67-68.

20

struck again. By October, shrimpers returned to the water, but agitation within
9

the industry remained far from over.

The NRA produced mixed results for the district's lumbermen as well.
Lumber yards and sawmills housed workers for months at a time when
conditions were favorable. However, their wages remained consistently lower
than prescribed by the NRA codes. Also, frequent accidents and primitive
sanitation left many employees unable to work, leaving the men with no
compensation. With the NRA's lumber codes remaining ineffective and many
smaller yards folding, only the Masonite Corporation's advances in the use of
wood chips saved that industry in District Six. By 1934 it was clear that, despite
its efforts, the NRA lacked sufficient accountability at the local level to carry out
its mission in South Mississippi.

10

If thoroughly enforced, Section 7(a) would have realigned power between
Mississippi's employers and employees. Collective bargaining rights would
immediately increase organized labor's economic strength. These potential
gains were unpopular among Mississippi's less enthusiastic New Dealers. Vocal
newspaper editor Fred Sullens of the Jackson Daily News had been suspicious
of Section 7(a) from the beginning. Along with other pro-business elements
within the state, he viewed labor unions as greedy and opportunistic. During the
national textile workers strike in 1934, a livid Sullens urged the Roosevelt
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administration to end the strike by any means necessary and advocated the
elimination of Section 7(a).

11

Colmer held a more favorable opinion of the NIRA. In a speech on the
House floor, Colmer voiced his admiration for the NIRA, specifically its benefits to
labor. "There has never been a Congress," he boasted, ''which has enacted into
law one-tenth as much legislation that is beneficial to the laboring man as this
Congress. . .. If all previous laws beneficial to labor were wiped off the statue
books and only those passed by the Seventy-third Congress were to remain,
labor would still be in the most exalted position that it has ever occupied under
the American flag ." Still in his inaugural congressional session, Colmer remained
steadfast in his support for the president's legislative agenda and urged his
constituents to do the same. "No longer can the industrial capitalists," he
insisted, "grind the helpless laborer under the steel heel of industry."

12

If Fred Sullens represented a reactionary faction at one end of the New
Deal spectrum and Colmer represented a blindly loyal faction at the other, where
did additional opinions fall within the spectrum in 1933 and 1934? While few
voiced the same disapproval as Sullens, others in the Sixth District lacked the
confidence of Colmer. The New Deal, though still in its infancy, had produced
limited results. As the alphabet agencies birthed by the Hundred Days legislation
produced mixed reactions, the earlier enthusiasm began to cool, at least partially.
As summer turned to fall and fall to winter, Mississippians realized that the reform
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and recovery efforts of the Hundred Days had not ended the Depression.
Roosevelt remained extremely popular personally with the state's many
Democrats, but certain pro-business elements began to realize that the New
Deal agenda, whatever it entailed, might push them further than they were willing
to go.
All the while, labor supporters remained anxious as well. To these
laborers, the administration appeared at least nominally concerned with the rights
of not only workers but of unions. Although Roosevelt held a largely ambivalent
attitude toward the advancement of organized labor in 1933, the administration
had recognized labor's interests. Though unions owed their gains more to a
friendly Congress and shrewd pro-labor lobbyists than to the president,
Roosevelt's early indifference was secondary to south Mississippi's laborers.
President Roosevelt, the NRA, and Section 7(a), regardless of actual
accomplishments, symbolized much more, and pro-labor elements in District Six
wanted to know just how hard the New Deal was willing to fight on their behalf.

13

By early 1934 South Mississippi's business elites were becoming more
outspoken about the NIRA's recovery efforts. To these interests, the New Deal's
pro-labor position looked more and more unappealing. When word began to
spread in the press that Senator Robert Wagner was sponsoring a new bill
advocating further concessions to labor, including worker's compensation
insurance, local businessmen protested. Richard Dunn of the American Oil
Company in Hattiesburg proclaimed the legislation vicious in nature and nothing
13
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but a victory for manipulative labor lords. J. H. Thickens of the Masonite
Corporation in Laurel worried that the legislation might rob employers of their
operational rights while leaving plant employees unaccountable to management.
A third business executive, E.G. Flowers of Enochs Lumber and Manufacturing
Company in Jackson, lamented to Colmer that any legislation sponsored by
Senator Wagner, "who is so pronouncedly pro-labor," would yield only adverse
effects. Colmer assured these men that Congress would likely adjourn before
14

the current Wagner legislation came to a vote.

Not surprisingly, voices on the opposite end of the labor spectrum also
spoke up. Organized labor throughout the district looked to take advantage of
the federal government's benevolence toward their cause. In March 1934, The
Gulfport Brotherhood of Railway and Steamshipclerks was still advocating a
shortened work week which would provide employment for its over 800,000
nationally displaced members. Other unions, such as the Painters, Paper
Hangers, and Decorators Local of Gulfport and Hattiesburg's United Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners of America, showed interest in the unemployment
insurance elements of Wagner's proposed legislation. Gulfport's Central Labor
Union, AFL-with over 1,500 members of voting age within the district, they
reminded Colmer-expressed similar interests in unemployment insurance as a
combatant to the suffering their members endured during the Depression.

14
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In early 1935, laborers in District Six remained adamant in their support for
the NRA, while the pro-business faction continued to object. The NIRA included
a sunset provision under which it would expire if not reauthorized within two
years. Roosevelt asked Congress for reauthorization in February 1935 but
received a hostile response. Similar hostility abounded in District Six. The
President of Cotton Mills Products Company complained to Colmer that the NRA
codes and high production costs enabled foreign producers like Japan and Brazil
to expand, while hindering the local textile industry's output. Horace Hinds of
Gulfport's United Cash Wholesale Company declared the NRA to be a mess,
littered with unenforceable, expense-boosting codes. More alarmed, B.A.
Weems of Hattiesburg insisted that Colmer "fight the NRA to a finish!" Weems
maintained that his pipe company, along with other small businesses in the area,
suffered unreasonably under the NRA codes which, he claimed, benefitted big
business at the expense of the little man and consumers. "The NRA," Weems
charged, "is playing the devil with the whole country. ... This thing should be
stopped and stopped at once."

16

With the NRA's future in limbo, labor unions reached out to Colmer in the
spring of 1935, intent on seeing the act reauthorized. One United Textile
Workers of America local informed Colmer that its 305 members voted
unanimously in favor of seeing the NRA's continuation. Interestingly enough,
some representatives of local business agreed with the unions' stance. Taking
an entirely different position than Weems, small business owner Kirk Burnham of
16
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Moss Point wrote Colmer, "It is my well grounded opinion that the NRA ought to
be continued as it is benificial [sic] to small business men and likewise to the
consuming public." Colmer agreed. 17
On Saturday, May 18, 1935, Colmer wrote a constituent in Greene County
a congratulatory telegram stating that the Senate voted to extend the NRA. Nine
days later, however, reauthorization of the NRA proved moot. On May 27, 1935,
recognized as Black Monday by the New Dealers, the Supreme Court, in a 9-0
decision, declared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional. In a
famous case involving the Schechter Poultry Company of Brooklyn, New York,
the Court concurred that the Schechter brothers had been illegally convicted on
several counts of violating the NRA poultry code. Schechter Poultry had dealt
solely in intrastate commerce, thus yielding no regulatory authority to the federal
government. The Supreme Court's decision voided the NRA. The New Deal's
original industrial recovery program was finished.

18

The Supreme Court's ruling stunned Roosevelt. The verdict levied a
direct assault against the New Deal unlike any yet seen during the president's
tenure. With the United States still facing economic uncertainty, Roosevelt
feared that he could not act to alleviate the Depression without having to answer
to the Court's rigid interpretation of the Constitution. The New Dealers realized
that the Court's ruling not only nullified the NRA, but it also threatened to
dismantle virtually every federal organization created in the previous two years.
The flood of legislation dating back to the Hundred Days Congress, David
17
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Kennedy notes in his massive Depression Era and World War II synthesis
Freedom From Fear, made a clash between the Roosevelt administration and
the judiciary inevitable.

19

The Supreme Court's ruling likewise stunned Colmer. During his second
term in Congress, Colmer began writing a weekly column, syndicated throughout
all of District Six's newspapers. Entitled Congressional Sidelights, the popular
and informative column featured a variety of subtopics relating to the
congressman's activities in the House. Published solely while Congress was in
session, the column ran continuously in the district for years. The weekly
discourse enabled Colmer to keep an open channel of communication with the
voters back home.
Following the Court's ruling, Colmer took to the local papers. In a June
1935 vignette entitled "NRA Held Unconstitutional," the congressman expressed
shock, devastation, and a general sense of confusion, sentiments mirrored by
many of his peers in the House. Colmer noted the precarious position in which
the entire New Deal found itself following the NRA ruling. He and his colleagues
were anxious to know what piece of New Deal legislation would be the next to
go. In his humble eulogy to the NRA, Colmer lamented that "principle [sic]
among its gains are the elimination of child labor, the improvement of labor
conditions, and the bringing of some order out of the chaos in which the country
found itself when the new Administration took office."20
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In hindsight, the failure of the NRA and Section 7(a) seems predictable.
The legislation, assembled swiftly during the height of Roosevelt's popularity in
1933, proved too ambiguous, too bureaucratic, and too voluntaristic. Bernard
Bellush notes in The Failure of the NRA that Congress and the administration
"ignored the lessons of history . .. and through Title I of the National Industrial
Recovery Administration, delegated unlimited decision-making power to an
unborn bureaucracy, with minimal clarity as to standards, guidelines, or
principles." While the NRA codes temporarily created a veil of order in certain
industries, particularly textiles, coal, and retail markets, in other sectors like steel
and the auto industry they proved asinine and unenforceable. This blend of
direct governmental partnership, paternalism, and constraint was a novel concept
within the business sphere and largely unwelcomed. On the other hand, many
businessmen made the codes work in their favor by fixing prices and production
levels, albeit detrimental to consumers. The NRA left most onlookers puzzled,
curious to know who was winning and who was losing because of the fair
competition codes. In its two year lifespan, the NRA tried to inject too much
power and innovation where there had been little previously, creating an
atmosphere of confusion.

21

Section 7(a) of the NIRA also proved to be deficient. Ultimately, the
amendment only encouraged management to practice collective bargaining with
its employees. Coercing big business with exemptions from antitrust prosecution
was an ineffective method of aligning the interests of industry and labor. When
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disgruntled employers chose to ignore Section 7(a), little could be done to deter
them. Laborers, expecting genuine industrial reform while receiving little, grew
disenchanted by the summer of 1935. Had the New Deal only given scant
interest to their plight? The answer would come shortly.

22

Despite its failure, the NIRA changed the course of labor's history. In less
than twenty-four months, the NRA and Section 7(a) energized a somewhat
dormant labor pool and reminded workers of the strength they shared collectively
when pursuing fair working conditions and wages. The NRA allowed fishermen
and shrimpers along the Gulf to gain traction in their unionizing efforts, something
they had previously been unable to maintain. Although many textile workers and
lumbermen in District Six gained only marginally from the labor legislation, the
emergence of an accountable federal government reinforced their support for the
Roosevelt administration. The benefits of the NRA were limited, but the agency
prevented the country's economic crisis from getting worse. Furthermore, the
seeds planted by the NRA and Section 7(a) in their two years would completely
redefine management-labor relations throughout the nation. For the rest of the
decade, anti-labor factions near and abroad would be forced to reconcile
themselves with the moderately intrusive, often recycled, calculated gambles
known more popularly by the moniker of New Deal legislation.

23

Colmer never budged in his support for NRA or the Roosevelt
administration in the first years of the New Deal. In a 1933 speech in Mobile,
Alabama, Colmer declared the NRA "the most revolutionary and comprehensive
22
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29
piece of legislation ever enacted by any Legislature . . . the most beneficial piece
of legislation ever enacted for the welfare of the common masses." Later in
1934, Colmer assured Gulfport's Central Labor Union, AFL, president of his
interest in seeing the proposed Wagner legislation passed. "It is my present
intention to support any measure that leads to a more amicable relationship
between capital and labor," he insisted. Immediately following the NRA's demise
in June 1935, he noted one last time, "Even the bitterest critics of the NRA admit
that gains have been made."

24

After two years, the verdict had arrived. "By the way, Bill Colmer has
made good up here in Congress-he is a live chap," wrote a Mississippi native
visiting Washington to a friend back home in Leaksville. "He has ability,
personality, and in fact everything that goes to make up a real good fellow." The
rookie congressman had proven to be a success. The legislative agenda that
Colmer had energetically supported for the two previous years, he believed,
served Mississippi well. Many Mississippians felt the same way. 25
Unlike Mississippi's other members of the lower House, Colmer
continually had to balance the demands of the state's most demographically
diverse voters. With so many of his constituents aligned with the cause of labor,
Colmer remained eager to support them. There were scores of working class
voters throughout the district who were anxious to cast a ballot for a
representative looking after their interests, and Bill Colmer failed to disappoint.
For better or for worse, the New Deal labor policies altered the psyche of
24
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Mississippi's working class. For a brief, yet encouraging, period the NRA and
Section 7(a) aroused hope for many workers in depressed Mississippi. Recovery
seemed near at hand.
Still, in early 1935, it was easy to be a liberal New Dealer. In his first
session in the House, Colmer's only controversial vote was pro-administration
and concerned alcohol. The majority of Colmer's southern peers still remained
securely hitched to the Roosevelt bandwagon. The transition leading to a
conservative coalition that historian James Patterson examined in the 1960s had
only minuscule roots in early 1935. By summer's end, however, the anti-New
Deal shift in Congress would slowly gain momentum. The major unifying factors,
opposition to a burgeoning federal bureaucracy and disdain for the New Deal's
domestic programs, remained just beyond the horizon. Hence, many of 1933's
active New Dealers would soon become displeased with the administration's
escalating course. By late 1935, several of Mississippi's once enthusiastic
supporters, such as newspaperman Fred Sullens and Congressman John
Rankin, began voicing anti-New Deal sentiments more frequently, something that
would have been branded as blasphemous in 1933. Bill Colmer, however,
remained confident. 26
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CHAPTER Ill
THE NEW DEAL TAKES A LEFT: THE WAGNER ACT AND THE
SECOND HUNDRED DAYS, 1935-1936
Even before the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial
Recovery Act, labor was expressing dissatisfaction with Section 7(a). In a May
20, 1935, letter to Congressman Colmer, American Federation of Labor
President William Green summarized what he viewed as 7(a)'s limitations:
Labor learned from experience during the last two years that Section 7-A
of the National Recovery Act, which provides for the right of working
people to join a union of their own choosing, to do so free from
intimidation, coercion or discharge, and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, was neither real nor operative. The
declared purpose of Congress to guarantee to Labor the right to organize
and bargain collectively, free from intimidation or coercion, was defeated
through the unrelenting opposition of employers and employes' [sic]
organizations. Because of this fact Labor earnestly seeks to secure the
1
enactment of a law which will make Section 7-A real.
Barely a week before the Black Monday ruling, Green was already
convinced that further legislation was needed to protect the rights of organized
workers. He particularly liked a bill sponsored in the Senate by Robert Wagner
of New York. Wagner had first introduced a labor bill in 1934, but Roosevelt,
nervous about midterm elections, effectively delayed any vote on it before
Congress adjourned later that summer. Throughout the winter, Wagner and his
assistants continued to hone the bill. Even without support from the Roosevelt
administration, the new legislation slowly began to gain traction as the 1935
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congressional session unfolded. Wagner's persistence would soon be
rewarded.

2

Like Green, laborers within District Six petitioned Colmer to support
Wagner's proposal. Despite the administration's apparent indifference, the bill
had become increasingly popular among labor's spokesmen. Before the
Supreme Court had even denounced the NRA, Gulfport's Bricklayers, Masons, &
Plasterers International Union and the Central Labor Union, both AFL affiliates,
informed Colmer of their support for the Wagner legislation. United Textile
Workers of America locals throughout the district did the same. In mid-May
1935, after the Senate agreed to reauthorize the NRA, the AFL and its
Mississippi affiliates advocated passage of the Wagner bill as a supplement to
the New Deal's original recovery program. In his letter to Colmer, Green insisted
that the legislation "is of major importance to the working people and their friends
throughout the entire country. For this reason I am earnestly appealing to you to
3

vote for the enactment of this measure into law."

Despite his steadfast support for the NRA, Colmer recognized its defects.
He realized that the fair competition codes and voluntaristic aspects of the NRA
left much to be desired by both management and labor. Colmer initially
welcomed the Wagner bill as a helpful revision which addressed the
shortcomings of the NRA. Just days before the Supreme Court's bombshell,
Colmer emphatically endorsed the Wagner legislation in a letter to Green. "I
2
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shall be glad to support this and any other legislation affecting labor if I can
possibly do so," Colmer informed the AFL president. Within days, however, the
NRA was dead, and the fate of organized labor was uncertain. Workers in
District Six feared that the gains made in the previous two years under the New
Deal would be erased. Colmer now viewed the Wagner legislation as more than
4

a helpful revision of the NRA. It had become a necessity.

Long before the Supreme Court nullified the NIRA, Wagner was
apprehensive about the agency's future. The senator also worried that the Court
would not rule favorably toward additional labor legislation. Anticipating judicial
scrutiny, he and his co-writers used language specifically intended to pacify the
Court and create optimal success for the bill. In February 1935, Wagner first
unveiled his labor proposal to the Seventy-fourth Congress. The bill had been
drafted the previous year by Wagner, his staff, and representatives of the
president's National Labor Relations Board, with no input from the Department of
Labor or the NRA. While similar to Section 7(a), the proposed legislation
provided significantly stronger accountability from the federal government. The
bill guaranteed the right of workers to organize independently and to bargain
collectively. Employers were prohibited from interfering, restraining, or coercing
workers in any manner regarding their right to unionize. The legislation outlawed
"dummy" unions, as the senator referred to them, controlled principally by
management. Wagner's proposal also called for a revamped NLRB, composed
of appointees selected by Roosevelt, whose job would be to prevent unjust labor
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practices by employers. Unlike earlier labor boards, this NLRB would serve as
an autonomous tribunal for employee grievances against management. The
previous NLRB, created by an Executive Order in June 1934, had been a
progressive step for the administration, but it lacked any genuine means of
protecting organized labor's rights. Wagner intended for the legislation to
strengthen labor by correcting the defects of Section 7(a) and the existing
NLRB.5
Wagner and his co-writers went to great lengths to define "commerce" and
"interstate commerce" in the bill. Aware that the terms held significance for the
Supreme Court's potential rulings, the Wagner team was meticulous with its
phrasing. The bill's Declaration of Policy maintained that insufficient bargaining
power between management and labor would hinder wage increases and reduce
purchasing power, thus prolonging the Depression and obstructing the ''free flow
of commerce." The declaration suggested that management's rejection of
collective bargaining would lead to more frequent strikes, also detrimental to the
"free flow of commerce." The NLRB would preside over all matters concerning
obstruction of the flow of commerce and disturbances regarding collective
bargaining. Wagner maintained that legitimate collective bargaining practices
would only accelerate the flow of commerce and aid, not hinder, purchasing
power. 6
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Wagner's proposals immediately encountered both support and
opposition. He planned to launch the legislation in the Senate, the more liberal of
the two houses since the November 1934 elections, hoping that success there
would persuade the other branches of government to follow suit. Corporate
America, however, was in an uproar. The National Association of Manufacturers,
the Automobile Manufacturers' Association, and the American Newspaper
Publishers' Association all adamantly opposed the legislation. During the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor's hearings in March, an ANPA representative
predicted that Wagner's bill would lead "to a labor dictatorship." Other critics
deemed the legislation one-sided, unfair, and unconstitutional. Labor interests,
however, were generally supportive of Wagner's proposals. In April, the AFL
held a symposium whose four hundred national delegates returned to their
districts and wrote their congressmen in favor of the bill. On May 2, the Senate
Labor Committee reported the bill, largely unchanged. Two weeks later the
legislation passed overwhelmingly in the upper House, despite continued
opposition from conservative senators and pro-business representatives who had
stormed Washington to condemn the bill. With the Senate behind him, Wagner
believed the administration would soon comply. 7
At no point since the introduction of the legislation in February had anyone
within the administration given the bill more than faint support. However, after
the Senate Labor Committee's report in early May, administrative agencies
rushed to claim the revised NLRB. Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, who had
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played no role in drafting the legislation, hoped to add the NLRB to her
department. Likewise, General Hugh Johnson, who had opposed the bill from its
inception, hoped the NRA would control the NLRB. The Department of Justice,
acting through Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, had unsuccessfully
attempted to control the NLRB's litigation policies. The sudden administrative
infighting worried Wagner. More troubling, however, was that despite the
Senate's endorsement, Roosevelt still refused to support the legislation.

8

The president resisted for several reasons. He had scarcely been
consulted in the drafting stages of the bill, and he disliked the separation of the
NLRB from the Department of Justice. In early 1935, Roosevelt still maintained a
centrist position regarding labor, preferring the NRA model of business-labor
cooperation to Wagner's more far-reaching ideas. Although the president had
maintained a precarious relationship with business elites in the first years of the
New Deal, he desperately wanted their support in the coming presidential
election. Roosevelt had no desire to jeopardize the support of business by
endorsing Wagner's controversial legislation. Rexford Tugwell, in The
Democratic Roosevelt, maintains that in early 1935, business support meant

more to the president than that of the labor unions. Tugwell insists that in mid1935 Roosevelt intended to ignore Wagner's bill and support impending social
security legislation. By backing the social security proposal, the president
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believed that he could endear himself to the rank-and-file voters without having to
negotiate with union leaders.

9

However, May 1935 marked a turning point for Roosevelt. When the
Senate voted overwhelmingly to pass the Wagner bill on May 16, the president
finally offered nominal support. After months of refusal, Roosevelt had been
coerced into backing the bill. As Wagner had predicted, support in the Senate
was key. On May 20, a House committee reported the bill, convincing the
president its passage was imminent. Four days later, Roosevelt and other
administration officials held a conference with Wagner, United Mine Workers of
America president John L. Lewis, and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America president Sidney Hillman to discuss provisions for the final legislation.
On May 25, the president announced his enthusiastic support for the bill.

10

Factors beyond Roosevelt's control best explain his reversal on the
Wagner bill. Earlier that May, the United States Chamber of Commerce had
denounced Roosevelt's domestic programs. Try as he might, the president could
not please pro-business interests, increasingly incensed at the course the New
Deal seemed to be charting. Then, only days after Roosevelt endorsed
Wagner's legislation, the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA. In a unanimous
decision, the Court deemed the New Deal recovery program unconstitutional,
erasing organized labor's gains under Section 7(a) and the government-business
partnership Roosevelt favored. The president viewed the assault on the NIRA as
9
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a threat to the entire New Deal, and he refused to watch idly as his programs
were endangered. The indolence and indecision Roosevelt had demonstrated
earlier in the year would give way to a renewed vitality unseen since the Hundred
Days.

11

In June, the administration initiated a "Second Hundred Days" of
legislative fervor centering on Wagner's labor bill and other social reforms.
Although eager to return home from the scorching Washington summer,
Congress remained in session at the president's request. Frustrated with
business leaders and determined to protect his New Deal from the Supreme
Court, Roosevelt urged the legislators to pass five key bills: Wagner's labor
proposal, a social security measure, a banking law, a public-utilities holding
company bill, and a tax bill aimed at the rich . Congress debated the measures
throughout the summer and finally adjourned in late August. While the original
Hundred Days Congress had emphasized recovery and relief in the wake of the
Depression, the Second Hundred Days legislation represented the most
sweeping social reforms that had ever come upon the floors of Congress. The
reforms passed that summer further enhanced the relationship between the
federal government and the American people and provided the framework for an
emergent welfare state. In the end, the session represented a victory for the
New Deal liberals, old progressives, labor interests, and the administration. In
some form, Roosevelt received everything he requested.
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On July 5, Wagner's bill, officially titled the National Labor Relations Act,
received the President's signature. The senator's efforts had finally culminated in
significant gains for labor: federal protection of collective bargaining rights, an
updated NLRB, the legalization of strikes, a permanent deathblow to company
unions, and working conditions free from "unfair labor practices." The NLRA
proved a crowning achievement of the New Deal, rectifying the imbalance of
power between business and labor. Labor unions across the country applauded
their newfound gains. 13
In Mississippi, response to the Wagner Act was mixed. When Biloxi's
Fleur De Lis Club, a social organization that included coastal workers, wrote
Colmer insisting he support the Wagner bill, the congressman wasted no time
relaying his support. "I favor all legislation which tends to the betterment of
labor," Colmer assured the group, just days before the House vote. Soon, labor ·
unions would be thanking Colmer for his support. Others within the district,
however, were critical of the legislation. Letters from the sixth district's business
elites poured in, one of which declared that the Wagner Act "will do more harm to
industries in this country than any other bill that has been proposed in Congress."
Colmer replied with courteous letters, assuring the businessmen that he would
bear their interests in mind. Among the state's congressional delegates, only
Colmer and Senator Theodore Bilbo earnestly supported the Wagner Act.
Congressman John Rankin of Tupelo expressed fury toward the labor law and
declared that if the legislation passed "the streets of southern towns would be red
13
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with blood." Other Mississippi delegates, like Senator Pat Harrison, supported
the measure solely on the basis of party loyalty. With a re-election campaign
looming in 1936, Harrison had no interest in breaking with the administration,
especially over a bill so certain to be enacted. Harrison's biographer, Martha
Swain, suggests that Mississippi's senior senator, along with many other
southern Democrats, supported the legislation while silently opposing it. 14
Harrison's attitude toward the Wagner Act mirrored a growing anxiety
among conservative Democrats, especially southerners, concerning the course
of the administration. The Second Hundred Days marked a turning point for the
New Deal, leaving earlier supporters confused and alienated. Increased hostility
from business had forced the president's hand. Realizing he could not appease
the business interests, Roosevelt defied them. The Wagner Act was only the tip
of the iceberg. The Second Hundred Days produced the Revenue Act of 1935, a
bill increasing taxes on corporations and the wealthy. Long advocated by
radicals in Congress, the revenue bill centered on an extreme redistribution of
wealth proposal. In its original form, the tax bill stunned conservatives in
Congress and angered the business community. The Senate Finance
Committee, chaired by Harrison, softened the bill's actual blow to business and
the wealthy, but the message was clear: Roosevelt, who had once courted
business' cooperation, was now adversarial. Although the final version of the bill
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was only a shell of the original, with little wealth actually redistributed, the break
between Roosevelt and big business became permanent. According to William
Leuchtenburg, the Revenue Act "created deeper business resentment than any
other New Deal measure."

15

The Public Utility Holding Company Act of the Second Hundred Days also
generated further friction between New Dealers and conservatives in
Washington. Though the bill ultimately passed the House with ease, its original
version contained a controversial "death sentence" provision authorizing the
Securities and Exchange Commission "to dissolve any holding company which
could not justify its existence." Lobbyists representing private power companies
flooded Washington, effectively protesting the death sentence stipulation. Many
Democrats in both houses broke with the administration, handing Roosevelt his
first substantial defeat. Even Colmer defiantly voted to axe the death sentence
provision from the utilities bill.

16

James T. Patterson, in Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal,
notes that the death sentence provision of the public utilities bill marked a
significant turning point for many conservative Democrats, whose sentiments
now shifted ''from unhappy loyalty to open opposition." For the first time, they
successfully defied the administration. Patterson maintains that "having left the
New Deal on one key issue, these Democrats were to find it easier to do so
again and again." The congressmen, many of whom originally supported the
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New Deal as a conservative method of ending the Depression, were convinced
that the Second Hundred Days had gone too far. As the session concluded in
late August and the weary legislators returned home, a conservative coalition
was emerging that would eventually prove troublesome for Roosevelt and his
New Deal.

17

Following the chaos of 1935's extended summer session, the second
year of the Seventy-fourth Congress seemed tame. The Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act would be the 1936 session's only major piece of labor legislation.
David Kennedy notes that the Walsh-Healey Act reflected Roosevelt's preferred
method of governing: direct partnership between government and business.
Using contracts tendered by the administration, rather than the bargaining power
of unions, businesses would be required to pay set wages and maintain quality
working conditions for laborers. The act established an eight-hour day and fortyhour week for employees working for government contractors and provided
overtime pay for excessive hours. Earlier in the session, Congress had
increased funding for the New Deal work relief agencies, and workers wanted a
share of the federal dollars that would be pouring into the state. Unions in south
Mississippi urged Colmer to support the legislation. 18
Roosevelt and Colmer both won reelection in 1936. In his first reelection
bid, the president soundly defeated Alf Landon of Kansas, garnering over 60
percent of the popular vote. Roosevelt retained the expected support of
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traditional Democratic stalwarts and broadened the party's appeal to untapped
voting markets. For the first time, African Americans and working class ethnic
groups in large cities supported the Democratic Party in high volume. These
voters contributed to the growth of organized labor during the New Deal.
Angered by New Deal reform measures, pro-business elements withheld votes
and money, yet organized labor's contributions helped offset the losses. The
president viewed his margin of victory as both vindication of the New Deal and a
mandate to extend it. His attempt to do so in 1937 would meet unexpected
consequences.

19

Colmer's popularity in 1936 was as high as it had ever been. He had won
reelection decisively in 1934, largely because of his Hundred Days record. By
1936, however, the New Deal had encountered setbacks as well as triumphs. In
a campaign stop that summer, Colmer defended his record:
My record in the brief time that I have represented you in Congress
constitutes the record of the Democratic Party and its great, humanitarian
leader, Franklin D. Roosevelt. For, with the exception of a few instances
. . . I have seen fit, as a Democrat elected by a Democratic constituency,
to go along with the Democratic Party and its great Democratic Chieftain,
President Roosevelt. Therefore, if I am to be charged with the mistakes of
President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, then in all fairness and
justice I should be given credit for the worthwhile accomplishments of the
20
Democratic Administration and President Roosevelt.
While Colmer's support for the Roosevelt administration certainly
contributed to his success in 1936, his popularity involved more than loyalty to
the president. After all, other southern congressmen, including Mississippians,
had defied the administration and suffered little political damage. If any single
19
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legislative trademark had endeared him to the voters of District Six, it was his
support of labor. Throughout the 1936 primary campaign, national affiliates of
various AFL unions urged their subsidiaries in Mississippi to continue to support
Colmer. The International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders, and
Helpers; the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks; the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen; and the Brotherhood of Maintenance and
Way Employes [sic] all instructed local lodges to endorse Colmer. "Urge
relatives and friends to do likewise," George M. Harrison, Grand President of
21

Cincinnati's Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks insisted.

Colmer welcomed labor's support. Demands in Washington afforded the
congressman little time for campaigning, yet labor's public endorsement helped
him compensate for time spent out of the district. Colmer recognized the letters
from both national and local labor offices as invaluable. Before the late summer
primary, Colmer wrote the AFL's Green, asking for the federation's official
endorsement.
I believe that I have a well right perfect record in the support of labor
legislation in Congress. I do not know what the custom of your
organization is, but I have received endorsements from several of the
organizations affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. If you
could see fit to send me such an endorsement that I could use publicly in
my campaign for re-election, I would appreciate it. 22
If not for factional politics, Colmer might have earned a third term without
opposition in 1936. In April, C. H. Ramsay alerted Colmer that Senator Theodore
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Bilbo had come out in support of John Lumpkin for the District Six seat. "If we
have any serious opposition, I believe Bilbo will develop it," warned Ramsay.
Although Colmer and Bilbo were both ardent New Dealers, Bilbo considered
Lumpkin a greater asset to his own political self-interest. Colmer, however,
remained confident. "I had been expecting this," he informed Ramsay, "as the
Junior Senator has let it be known that he would support Lumpkin against me .
. . . I have never been a faction al politician and do not want to be forced into
being one now, but it looks like we are going to have to whip them both!"
Colmer's confidence turned out to be well-founded. In a one-sided August
primary, the incumbent congressman indeed whipped Bilbo's candidate by a
margin of nearly three to one.23
Two final factors emerging in late 1936 underscored Colmer's credentials
as both a liberal and a champion of organized labor. On the state level,
Governor Hugh White proposed a Balance Agriculture With Industry program
designed to stimulate industrial expansion. For decades, the anti-corporate
sensibilities of agrarian Populists-Progressives had restricted efforts to
industrialize. White envisioned BAWi as a way to modernize Mississippi in the
wake of shrunken agricultural markets. The proposal called for a new law
enabling local governments across the state to issue bonds that would finance
the construction of factories, which could be used to entice out of state
businesses to relocate to Mississippi and create much-needed jobs. In
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September 1936, the state legislature enacted White's Mississippi Industrial
Act.24
The act created a State Advertising Commission, a State Industrial
Commission, and a State Planning Commission, all working together to attract
industry into the state. Upon petition by 20 percent of the registered voters of any
county or municipality, the Industrial Commission could, at its discretion, issue a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. The certificates allowed local
governments to hold bond hearings regarding factory construction and land
purchases. The most significant role of the three member Commission was to
screen proposals from potential applicants looking to relocate to the Magnolia
State. 25
Even though BAWi brought in twelve new businesses and put many
Mississippians to work during White's administration, criticism abounded. Critics
maintained that BAWi attracted only low-wage industries, providing little longterm relief to the state's economy. Also, no recognition was given to organized
labor. BAWl's initial appeal for many of the northern companies electing to
relocate was the anti-union climate in Mississippi. The governor made no secret
of his disdain for labor unions. He assured prospective industries that labor
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agitation in the state was minimal. White and the Commission behaved as if the
New Deal's legislation and labor unions did not exist. 26
The divergent views of White and Colmer regarding labor are revealing.
Both men wanted to see jobs created for the destitute constituents they
represented. Both hoped industrialization could rescue Mississippi from the
Depression. However, one man embraced labor legislation, and the other
ignored it. Mississippi's desperate condition demanded immediate economic
relief, which BAWi provided, but White's failure to recognize the rights of labor
proved shortsighted, as shipyard magnate Robert Ingalls would later point out to
him . White's conservative views regarding organized labor help emphasize
Colmer's liberal position in 1936.27
A second factor in late 1936 also illustrates Colmer's role as an effective
advocate for organized labor. In September, the AFL suspended John L. Lewis's
Committee for Industrial Organization, leading to an eventual split within the
union. Although the industrial unions represented by the CIO achieved historic
national gains during the 1930s, the predominance of craft unions would
preclude any significant advances in Mississippi. Instead, the AFL largely
continued to represent labor interests in the state. Historian Wayne Flynt
maintains that by 1936, although unions were not as prevalent in Mississippi as
in other states, organized labor was surprisingly active politically and "quite
sophisticated for a state with so little union tradition." Flynt attributes this partly to
the moderate policies of William Green and the AFL, whose strategy in
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Mississippi, according to Donald Mosley, was "to sell itself as a friend of
management, not unreasonable in its demands." While Colmer viewed Lewis as
tyrannical and counterproductive to organized labor, he approved the approach
of Green, whom he found likeminded and reasonable. Green's moderate
demeanor would serve his union well, and the AFL's resistance to industrial
unionism made the growth of organized labor more palatable in Mississippi. By
distancing itself from the CIO in 1936, the AFL was able to achieve modest
success in the state by the end of the New Deal.

28

Nineteen thirty-six would end well for both Roosevelt and Colmer.
Congress and the American voters had given the president everything he
desired. The citizens of District Six had done the same for their congressman.
The New Deal would soon peak, however, winning scattered victories through
1938, but prolific legislative sessions mirroring those of 1933 and 1935 would not
occur. For the president, 1937 would bring increased congressional hostility, the
likes of which he had yet to encounter. For Colmer, the remaining years of the
New Deal would present further opportunity to distinguish himself from his
Mississippi colleagues in the House.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION AND LABOR'S FINAL
VICTORY, 1937-1940
Only months removed from a sweeping national victory, Franklin
Roosevelt would encounter unexpected hostility from the Seventy-fifth Congress.
Thanks in part to his own political miscalculations, the president continued to
alienate former supporters. An attempt to reorganize the Supreme Court, an illadvised response to controversial sit-down strikes, and a mid-year recession
troubled many lawmakers and led to a legislative deadlock. The conservative
coalition on Capitol Hill, whose nucleus had formed during the Second Hundred
Days, continued to gain members and momentum throughout 1937. This body
would prove troublesome for the president. The landslide victory of 1936
convinced the New Dealers to enact a more radical legislative agenda, but the
conservatives in Congress, especially southerners, were becoming increasingly
uncooperative. Gradually, Bill Colmer would watch his southern peers break ties
with the New Deal. 1
The first significant source of congressional dissent in 1937 arose from
Roosevelt's infamous "court-packing" plan. Since "Black Monday'' in 1935, the
president had explored ways to circumvent the anti-New Deal rulings of the
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Court continued to strike down New Deal
legislation, and the Social Security Act and the Wagner Act appeared particularly
vulnerable. The Court's strict interpretation of the Constitution threatened not
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only to dismantle the administration's previous accomplishments but to prevent
further social reforms as well. Roosevelt was convinced that the justices, not the
Constitution, presented the greatest challenge to the New Deal.

2

In February 1937, Roosevelt offered Congress a blueprint for judicial
reorganization. Most legislators, unaware that it would be presented, were
stunned by the proposal. In his Congressional Sidelights column, Colmer
detailed the president's plan:
The Supreme Court is at present composed of nine judges. President
Roosevelt now proposes that he be allowed to appoint one extra judge for
each Justice over 70 years of age who continues to serve, with 15 set as
the maximum number of Justices on the Bench. In other words, under this
plan, if Judge Van Devanter, for example, continues to serve, President
Roosevelt will have the right to appoint another judge to serve with him.
Any appointment that is made must be confirmed by the Senate, and the
appointment will be for life. Life-tenure of office is given to the Justices by
the Constitution, and Congress has no power to change it.3
Roosevelt's request for judicial reform was partly practical, partly
disingenuous, and wholly political. He explained to Congress that the additional
justices were essential for promoting judicial efficiency. Furthermore, the
president argued that the age of the current justices (the average being seventyone) might impede their ability to rule soundly in an adverse economy. Along
with the six potential appointees to the Supreme Court, the president desired to
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name as many as forty-four additional judges to the lower courts. He viewed
these courts as slow and overburdened as well.

4

Roosevelt's presentation of the court scheme was flawed from the outset.
At no point during the presidential campaign of 1936 had he declared judicial
reorganization a priority, and Democratic leaders in both houses were incensed
that they had not been informed about the bill. Even liberals recognized that the
president was playing politics with one of the country's most sacred institutions.
Despite any legitimate criticisms Roosevelt could cast upon the Court, support for
his proposal was limited. As David Kennedy notes, "neither efficiency nor age
5

was the real issue, and Roosevelt knew it . . . so did the country."

Moderate and conservative Democrats who had feared breaking with the
president were now presented a golden opportunity. Dragged by the New Deal's
popularity further than anticipated, they had hesitated to oppose the
administration openly. Roosevelt's attack on the hallowed Court, however,
offered Democrats a chance to challenge the president without facing the wrath
of an angry electorate. In the words of historian Martha Swain, former New
Dealers realized that "retrenchment was now possible." For the first time,
moderates in the Senate joined ranks with Republicans and conservative
Democrats, who viewed the Court as the only means of restricting the New
Deal's radical agenda. To hand Roosevelt the Court, the Senate feared, would
create a dictatorship. House sentiments largely mirrored those of the Senate,
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and, according to James T. Patterson, the Court proposal united moderate and
conservative representatives and showcased the president's vulnerability.

6

Roosevelt's assault on the Court was a political disaster, and it was
unnecessary. By May, the Supreme Court had upheld the two acts New Dealers
considered most endangered, the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act.
Moreover, in late spring, Justice Willis Van Devanter announced his plans to
retire after almost twenty-seven years on the bench, allowing Roosevelt to add a
pro-administration Justice to the Court and solidify a permanent majority favoring
the New Deal.

7

The president appointed liberal Hugo Black to the vacated seat. In his
syndicated column, Colmer endorsed the choice and accurately described the
mood in Washington regarding the nomination:
On Thursday of last week the President sent to the Senate for
confirmation the name of Hugo L. Black, senior Senator from Alabama, to
fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court. This created quite a furor on
Capitol Hill. It was highly gratifying to the most ardent New Dealers but
met with equal adverse criticism by the more conservative element.
Senator Black is regarded as ultra-progressive, and the more conservative
New Dealers take the position that on all constitutional questions
appearing before the Court and affecting New Deal measures he would be
8
like the billy goat at the animal convention-already voted.
The outcome of the court-packing scheme was double-sided for the
president. As usual, Roosevelt eventually got what he wanted, but this time he
paid a high price. Black's presence made the Supreme Court considerably more
liberal, but it also heightened the conservative coalition's sense of urgency.
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"Congress," as Patterson notes, "would have to take the Court's place in stopping
the New Deal." The administration now faced a new level of congressional
9

hostility that would diminish legislative achievements.

In addition to the court reform setback, Roosevelt faced criticism in 1937
for his response to a series of "sit-down" strikes by CIO unions. By sitting down
at the workplace, strikers took control of plants for extended periods of time,
often with violent results. Neither federal nor state governments would employ
force to remove the strikers, alarming even middle-class property owners across
the country. Roosevelt condemned CIO leader John L. Lewis and his tactics, but
conservatives in Congress branded the president as apathetic to the rights of
business and private property owners. The refusal to use force against the
strikers hurt the president politically.

10

In Mississippi, businessmen viewed both the strikes and the CIO with
disdain. B.B. Davis, a hotel proprietor from Waynesboro, asked Colmer, 'Why in
the name of High Heaven, don't you Congressmen and Senators pass some
measure putting a stop to this striking business going on over the Nation? .. .
Are you just going to sit there and allow Lewis and his Alien Cohorts to ruin the
manufacturing interests of the Country?" Roscoe Ford, a Marion County
attorney, agreed. ''The principles of democrary [sic] laid out by Jefferson and
Jackson and Cleveland appeal to me," he wrote Colmer, "but somehow, the
interpretation of these principles by these great Party leaders is not the same
interpretation that John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman give." Ford feared that the
9
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president had forsaken national recovery for the radical CIO agenda: "I think the
President is badly in need of some advice from somebody other than these
chronic uplifters and social welfare workers."

11

Colmer, too, disliked John L. Lewis. "Your letter was rather emphatic," he
replied to Davis. "For this, I do not censure you. On the contrary I can readily
understand your righteous indignation. . .. It is beyond me to understand how
anybody could condone this unlawful method of depriving people of their
property." He suggested, however, that local government, not Congress, was
responsible for failing to act. "Sit-down strikes," Colmer insisted, "are violations
of the law of trespass of every state in the union, and if the state officials in states
having these strikes saw fit to evict them they could do it."

12

Other prominent Mississippians also expressed contempt for the CIO.
Senator Pat Harrison had "no sympathy with sit-down strikes" and viewed John

L. Lewis as little more than an agitator. Editor Fred Sullens found Lewis and his
organization deplorable. While never a fan of organized labor, Sullens
recognized the AFL as the lesser of two evils. The editor declared the militant
CIO a hazard to the country and considered Lewis "far more dangerous than
Scarface Al Capone." According to John Ray Skates, the Daily News editor's
hatred of Lewis "became almost a mania." In a Nashville Banner article,
Congressman John Rankin stated that the CIO was "communism run riot," filled
with agitators who wanted to destroy southern industries. "The widening
industrial future of the South," he claimed, "must not be imperiled by Communist
11
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intrigue or unfair procedure by agencies clothed with federal authority." Although
Colmer's rhetoric was not always as colorful as that of his fellow Mississippians,
this would be the only labor issue on which he would agree with them during the
entire New Deal.

13

Along with the court plan and the sit-down strikes, a serious economic
downturn in mid-1937 caused early supporters to reexamine their loyalty to the
administration. After four years of slow but steady economic gains, the country
slid into deep recession. This recession proved troublesome for the
administration; a break in the economy would signal that the New Deal had failed
to alleviate the Depression. Between Labor qay and Christmas, two million
Americans lost their jobs, and industrial output dropped at a pace near that of the
months immediately following the crash of 1929. Voters had eagerly supported
the New Deal because it seemed to solve the economic crisis, but by the end of
the year, it was clear that the New Deal had not created total stability.

14

Blame for the recession lay largely at the administration's feet. Although
deficit spending had been vital to the New Deal's recovery efforts, the years of
economic growth convinced the president that it was now safe to slash
expenses. In an attempt to placate the balanced-budget faction in Washington,
Roosevelt cut federal spending by ten billion dollars in June. The results were
disastrous.

15
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The financial collapse puzzled Roosevelt. He neither anticipated the
recession nor knew how to fix it. His advisors in the administration offered mixed
counsel. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who believed that a balanced
budget was vital to encourage investment, recommended that Roosevelt keep
federal spending to a minimum. Other advisors, notably SEC commissioner
Jerome Frank and Federal Reserve Board head Marriner Eccles, maintained that
only federal spending would stimulate the economy and end the recession. After
months of wavering, the president sided with the latter, but economic stability
would not be achieved immediately.16
The "Roosevelt Recession" of 1937 played a significant role in uniting
conservative Democrats and Republicans. Patterson maintains that the dire
economic conditions caused leaders in both houses to seek a "permanent
bipartisan coalition" against the administration. The recession was a third and
final catalyst in 1937 allowing disgruntled congressmen, especially southerners,
to sever ties with the New Deal. Although the administration's failures in 1937
were glaring, Colmer remained hesitant to shift his allegiances. As he watched
many of his southern colleagues jump off of the Roosevelt bandwagon, Colmer
did not budge. He determined that the New Deal, though weakened, still had
more to offer the folks back home in south Mississippi. 17
The New Deal did, in fact, have one major piece of legislation left in its
arsenal. Since the collapse of the NRA, the administration had quietly been
preparing a wages and hours bill. In mid-1935, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins
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instructed her department's attorneys to compose multiple drafts of a law setting
a minimum wage rate with a mandatory increased rate for hours beyond a
maximum work week. Roosevelt fully supported Perkins' proposal. The WalshHealey Public Contracts Act of 1936 provided a partial template for the
Roosevelt-Perkins plan. Though limited to federal contracts, Walsh-Healey
established an eight-hour day and forty-hour week and demanded that
employers pay wages set by the Labor Department. Many viewed the proposal
as both a "token of good faith" from the administration to organized labor and an
indication that the New Deal intended to create better working conditions and
provide fair compensation for employees.

18

After the recent political setbacks, Roosevelt and Perkins were anxious to
revive the New Deal, and their plan centered on the fair labor standards
proposal. Perkins sent a draft of the bill to Benjamin Cohen and Thomas
Corcoran, two of Roosevelt's closest legal advisors, who then readied the bill for
Congress. In its earliest form, the bill dealt solely with wage and hours
provisions, but Roosevelt, believing that it would be well received by Congress,
added a strict provision preventing children under the age of sixteen from
working in industries involved in interstate commerce.19
On May 24, 1937, Roosevelt offered the bill to Congress. Senator Hugo
Black, who had yet to ascend to the Supreme Court, and Massachusetts
Congressman William P. Connery, who would die within a month, sponsored the
legislation in their respective houses. The original bill authorized Congress to
18
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"set minimum-wage scales and maximum-hours schedules," of forty cents per
hour and forty hours per week. The bill also created an independent labor board
consisting of five appointees selected by the president. The board was given
authority to "increase minimum standards after proper hearings, if collective
bargaining had been attempted and failed." Lastly, the bill included the child
labor restriction. The president insisted that the bill be passed immediately, but
Congress proved hesitant. 20
Thus began the most heated debate District Six would endure throughout
the entire New Deal, with Colmer playing the role of mediator. The wages and
hours dispute created more hysteria among south Mississippi businessmen than
any piece of legislation the administration had yet presented. Like many
southern congressmen, business leaders in District Six had grown weary of the
New Deal's social reforms and what they perceived as Roosevelt's radical new
agenda. Many among south Mississippi's elite had accepted the early New Deal
as a conservative means of combating the Depression. By 1937, however, their
support was waning. By contrast, labor's support for the president had continued
to grow, and workers in the district were pleased to hear of the impending wages
and hours legislation. Colmer would be forced to appease both interests.
Initial resistance in District Six centered on the bill's lack of regional wage
differentials, and opponents feared that the legislation would cripple industries in,
not only Mississippi, but the entire South. Throughout the New Deal, southern
politicians and businessmen argued that the "kindly'' living conditions of the
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South allowed for a lower, yet fair, wage scale, making regional differentials
necessary. "If this hour and wage legislation without a differential is put into
effect and it closes the industries at Columbia, Hattiesburg, Laurel, Picayune,
Gulfport, and Pascagoula, it will be difficult for your friends to stir up any
enthusiasm for your candidacy for any office," wrote Marion County attorney
Roscoe Ford. In a separate letter, Ford attempted to explain the wages and
hours dilemma to Colmer. "This bill is designed," he said,
to destroy Southern industry and if enacted in the law will absolutely have
that effect. . .. W ith no differential at all existing, the moment such a Bill
passes, you may expect every industry affected to cease operations and
to dismantle. . .. Mills in the extreme South have but one natural
advantage and that is climate, resulting in a saving on fuel used to heat
the home, the cost of clothing and the cost of food. The living cost per
week for a laborer in the South living on the same standard of living as a
laborer in the North, is at least $5.00 less than in New England and the
Middle States. In other words, a girl earning $50.00 per month in the
South is getting net just as much as a girl earning $70.00 per month in
New England or the Middle States. . .. If this Ellenbogen Bill passes, or
any other one passes without the proper wage differential, you may expect
the plants . . . to dismantle . .. and move elsewhere. Anybody who thinks
to the contrary is simply not informed on the subject. ... I hope that you
will be able in a proper way to persuade the President to recede from
Secretary Perkins' position, and give the South a little chance.21
Ford's letters were among the first Colmer received regarding the wages
and hours fight. In his reply to Ford, Colmer conceded that he had given the
impending bill little deliberation. For the next year, however, no piece of New
Deal legislation would be brought to Colmer's attention more frequently. The
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wages and hours bill would become "political poison" in Mississippi, and Colmer
would be forced to drink.22
As the debate over wages and hours legislation continued in Washington,
south Mississippians expressed their reservations. "If this bill is enacted into law,
it means the end of our business," wrote a disgruntled furniture store owner from
Laurel. 'We simply cannot operate on 35 or 40 hours a week, and our business
will not justify us in putting on two crews. . . . As we see it, if the President and
the Congress would just call it a day ... it would be the best thing for the
country." J. 8 . Wheat, a lumberman from Hancock County, shared similar
sentiments. "We employ regularly ... some 75 to 100 families to whom we pay
fair wages," he wrote. "Our employes [sic] are happy and contented, but if we
have to subscribe to such a bill . . . we will simply have to close our operations
and throw all these good friends and neighbors out of employment."23
The child-labor provisions aroused concern as well. Lumberton attorney
John Yeager wrote Colmer on behalf of fellow Pearl River County resident W. H.
Slocomb. Slocomb's vegetable container plant employed approximately thirty to
thirty-five young men, between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, who worked
seasonally to earn money for school. According to Yeager, the plant serviced
states as far away as Colorado. Yeager and Slocomb feared that the standards
imposed by the wages and hours bill would "knock many worthy school boys out
of employment .. . thus depriving them of the completion of high school or junior
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college work." As confusion surrounded the impending legislation in mid-1937,
Yeager's and Slocomb's concerns were both relevant and misguided. Colmer
understood that the child-labor provisions intended to prevent the exploitation of
children in industry, not eliminate the summer earning potential of sixteen-yearold students. Likewise, Colmer agreed that Slocomb's employees should
continue their work. "You and I know," he wrote Yeager, "that many of our most
substantial citizens were able to get their start so to speak from their ability to
make a few dollars in the summer to return to school in the winter."

24

Letters endorsing the wages and hours proposal also flooded Colmer's
office. Both organized and unorganized laborers in the district urged Colmer to
support the bill. "Just a line to tell you that I am a sawmill man and we want the
eight hour law," wrote a Hancock County worker. "You see Bill, it takes us
sixteen hours on the job some days to make fifteen cents per hour and meat is
thirty-five cents per pound. Now what must we do?" On the night of July 28, a
meeting was held in Laurel for Jones County citizens favoring the bill. ''We the
people of Jones County, Mississippi in mass meeting assembled do hereby
endorse said legislation and urge upon our Senators and Representatives in
Congress to support and urge its enactment into law," their resolution declared.
Perhaps the most revealing letter in the summer of 1937 came from Hattiesburg
attorney William Haralson, who informed Colmer,
This letter is being written to you as a State Committeeman of Labor's
Non-Partisan League, as well as in the capacity of a citizen. I have
received several communications, pro and con, about the Black-Connery
Labor Act. In talking to a great many people, I find that the working class
24
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are very much interested in this bill being passed, and at this session of
Congress. They do not care so much about what hours and wages are
fixed . What they want is some new standard by which the working people
will receive a decent wage, and won't have to work day and night. I am
writing you because I know you want to hear what the folks are talking
about. The people feel that they have very little, so far, to show for their
endorsement of the New Deal, and they are going to be mighty
25
disappointed if this labor bill is not passed.
The fate of the Black-Connery bill, however, would not be decided in
1937's summer congressional session. In the Senate, the legislation met
opposition from Republicans and southern conservatives, who objected to
expanding the New Deal. Surprisingly, the AFL and CIO also opposed the bill
and requested that it be amended. Both William Green and John L. Lewis
expressed apprehension about the labor board, which, they feared, would
undermine labor's greatest weapons, collective bargaining and the strike. Also,
Green and Lewis feared a board selected by any incumbent administration,
wh ich would potentially leave the unions at the mercy of an anti-labor president.
After nearly two months of legislative quarreling, the Senate approved a
weakened bill 56-28. In early August, the House version reached the Rules
Committee and met further opposition from hostile Republicans and southern
Democrats. Colmer reported, "The Committee is sharply divided on the best
methods for handling this perplexing question. Most southern members feel that
there is grave danger if the bill is enacted into law, of injuring rather than helping
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labor." The bill would languish in the Rules Committee for the remainder of the
summer.

26

Furious over the committee's inaction, Roosevelt attempted to force
Congress' hand. On October 12, he called for a special session, beginning the
following month. Convinced that the wages and hours bill deserved immediate
attention, Roosevelt hoped a second round of congressional debate would yield
results. After eleven months of administrative blunders and party infighting,
however, many former New Dealers continued to oppose both the administration
and the bill. 27
As the special congressional session neared the holiday season, the
mood in Washington was far from merry. After their brief autumn recess,
Republicans and conservative Democrats had returned to the Capitol seemingly
more eager than ever to block further New Deal legislation. Despite pressure
from Roosevelt, the Rules Committee still refused to release the bill. Then, in
late November, Congresswoman Mary Norton of New Jersey, the House Labor
Committee chair, offered an amendment to the wages and hours bill and
campaigned to bring it to the House floor. By December 2, Norton had collected
the 218 votes required to get the bill out of committee, but another barrier
thwarted her efforts. 28
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Green and the AFL remained unhappy with the bill. Having already
expressed opposition to the proposed labor board, the union also refused to
support Norton's amendment, which would have reduced the board to a single
administrator within the Department of Labor. In late 1937, Green's objective
was to protect his craft unions from what he feared might become a pro-industrial
union board. Also, Green wanted the Department of Justice to enforce the wage
and hour standards to safeguard subsequent gains. Only days after Norton had
secured enough votes to send the· bill to the House floor, Green forced Congress
to reconsider. 29
The AFL's dissatisfaction with the labor bill was no secret, and Colmer
agreed with the union's anti-CIO sentiment. Green wrote Colmer twice during
the special session to explain the Federation's position and to solicit support.
"The American Federation of Labor," he informed Colmer on November 22,
feels that the character of the changes to the present draft of the Fair
Labor Standards Bill now before the House Rules Committee is such that
proper consideration thereof can only be had before the House Labor
Committee, where it was originally considered, rather than on the floor of
the House. It feels, therefore, that the draft should be referred back to that
committee for amendments or that a new bill be substituted.30
From his Congressional Sidelights pulpit, Colmer offered his two cents to
the residents of District Six:
This possibly is the most highly controversial piece of legislation that has
come before Congress in many years. The South is almost unanimously
opposed to this measure on the theory that it will - first, prevent, or at
least retard, the industrialization of the South; second, that it will close
down a large number of small industries as well as some larger ones at a
time when unemployment is so heavy .. . On the eve of battle on this
legislation in the House we find the House of Labor divided. The bill is
29
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being fostered and sponsored by John L. Lewis' Committee for Industrial
Organization while William Green, the head of the American Federation of
Labor, is vigorously opposing the bill in its present form. 31
On December 16, Green wired Colmer one final time during the special
session. "I respectfully request," he said, "you vote to recommit (the bill) to the
appropriate committee for revision, study, and necessary changes in order to
make it a practical and constructive measure." The next day, Colmer voted with
a slight majority in the lower house to recommit the wages and hours bill to
Norton's Labor Committee. James T. Patterson hailed the vote as "the most
smashing defeat Roosevelt had ever received in the House." Although a defeat
for the administration, the vote represented a solid victory for Green and the

AFL.32
Pat Harrison biographer Martha Swain maintains that "not one of the
seven Mississippians voted for the bill" when it arrived on the House floor in midDecember. She fails to differentiate, however, among Mississippi's seven nays.
Colmer's vote to recommit the bill to committee in no way reflected the anti-labor
sentiments of District One's John Rankin or District Three's Will Whittington. Nor
did it indicate opposition to either the administration or the principles of wage and
hour standards. Colmer was rather, simply, responding to the concerns of Green
and members of the AFL affiliates who dominated the labor movement in District
Six. As he explained to his constituents, "An open fight was waged by the John

L. Lewis controlled CIO, who advocated the legislation and the William Green
AFL, who opposed it. This resulted in many Representatives who are ordinarily
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favorable to labor legislation voting to recommit the bill, which course was
advocated by the AFL." 33
Recommitting the wages and hours bill to the House Labor Committee
would be the last congressional action of 1937. Twice, Roosevelt had watched
conservatives stall the administration's top legislative priority. As the holidays
approached, Congress adjourned with the bill's fate yet to be determined. Before
heading home for Christmas, Colmer concluded, "Just what the future of this type
of legislation is, no one knows at this time."34
Less than three weeks after recommitting the bill, the lawmakers
reconvened for a third session of the Seventy-fifth Congress. The administration,
again, made wages and hours legislation a priority. For the next four months,
Roosevelt, Perkins, Green, Norton, and Georgia Congressman Robert C.
Ramspeck worked to refine the bill. In April, the House Labor Committee
reported an AFL approved bill, which, like its predecessors, met hostility from
Republicans and southern Democrats on the Rules Committee. Finally on May
6, Norton once again rallied enough support to have the bill discharged from the
committee and brought to the House floor for a vote.35
By May 1938, the wages and hours frenzy had occupied the attention of
south Mississippians for an entire year. As the showdown in the House
approached, business leaders in District Six bombarded Colmer with mail.
Representatives of the Masonite Corporation, F.S. Senton Cotton Company, and
Eastman-Gardiner Hardwood Company of Laurel; Hattiesburg Compress
33
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Company; and Goodyear Yellow Pine Company of Picayune urged Colmer to
oppose the bill. Gulf Coast hotels, banks, law offices, and chambers of
commerce did the same. "It seems to me that the South has been knifed enough
36

already," Laurel businessman J. W . Bailey pleaded.

Organized labor also lobbied Colmer. Green, Lewis, and Sidney Hillman,
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, urged him to support the
revised wages and hours bill, as did numerous unions in District Six.
Hattiesburg's International Association of Machinists solicited Colmer's "wholehearted support," and the Mississippi State Federation of Labor, upon learning
that the bill had been "OK'd by William Green," added its endorsement. Most
compelling, however, was a stirring resolution from Gulfport's Central Labor
Union. The document had been composed at a May 19 joint meeting of the
state's eight Central Labor Unions, all of which were AFL affiliates and five of
which were located in District Six. The resolution, which also denounced a
recent meeting of southern industrial leaders in New Orleans, defined southern
labor's demands:
Whereas, the Southern industrialists, with their usual hypocrisy and
deception pretend to base their opposition to the Wage and Hour Bill on
the alleged ground that it will cripple and retard industrial activity and
development in the South, but in .reality are opposing it because they are
determined to do all in their power to keep the workers of the South
chained to the chariot-wheel of starvation wages and degrading conditions
of work in order to extract still more profits from the sweat, blood, and
tears of Southern workers, who are rebelling as never against industrial
despots and oligarchs of the South, therefore,
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Be It Resolved that we, the representatives of organized labor in
the State of Mississippi, feel it our stern duty to raise our voices in behalf
of all Southern workers, the organized or unorganized, and to promote
with every means at our command the speedy passage of the Wages and
Hours Bill during the present session of Congress; and to condemn and
denounce as hypocritical and false the prophesies of calamity to Southern
industry made by the Southern Industrialists who conferred and conspired
against the said Bill in New Orleans, and
Be It Further Resolved that the Southern industrialists and all
others of a like mind who oppose the Wage and Hour Bill, are the avowed
enemies of the Southern working class, and are a stumbling block to the
development of the South toward a higher and fiarer [sic] civilization, in
that the said industrialists are willing for the millions of the Southern
masses to remain crucified on the CROSS OF EXPLOITATION AND
37
GREED erected by the hands of those same industrialists.
On May 24, 1938, the wages and hours bill easily passed in the House,
314-97. Patterson notes that of the fifty-six Democrats who opposed the bill,
fifty-two were southerners. After three years of increased New Deal liberalism,
these representatives permanently broke with the administration. Colmer
remained one of few southerners, and the only Mississippian, to support the
wages and hours legislation. In what had become the decade's most contentious
political issue, Colmer stood alone among the Mississippi House delegation.
Two days later he boasted to the Gulfport Central Labor Union, AFL, "No doubt
you know by this time that I was the only member of the Mississippi delegation
who voted for this bill. I hope, as one who is sincerely interested in the South .. .
that those who think this will destroy our section of the country will find that their
apprehensions are not well-founded."38
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After passing the House, the bill moved to a Senate-House Conference
Committee, where it received further modifications. The committee placed
administration of the law under a single agent in the Department of Labor and set
the hourly wage rate at twenty-five cents the first year with scheduled gradual
increases lifting it to forty cents by 1945. The bill set the maximum number of
hours per week at forty-four for the first year and forty-two the second year. In
the third year, the forty hour week would be implemented, and employers
maintained the right to exceed the hour limitations if time-and-a-half wages were
awarded. The bill protected children under the age of sixteen from hazardous
and exploitive industries and, thanks to pressure from the southern delegates,
exempted many agricultural workers. Among Mississippi's delegation, only
Colmer and Senator Bilbo voted for the final version of the bill. Roosevelt signed
the Fair Labor Standards Act, as it was officially titled, on June 25, 1938. After
nearly fourteen months of legislative wrangling, the administration could finally
declare a victory for its bill and for organized labor.3~
In the weeks following, Colmer's acclaim grew both in Congress and
among the national labor unions. House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn of Texas
wrote to thank him for his loyalty to the Democratic Party. "You will gain power
and influence in years to come," Rayburn pledged. William Green declared
Colmer "a most favorable champion of the AFL's legislative program." The
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers of
Kansas City and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes [sic] of
Detroit sent similar gestures of goodwill. Colmer embraced the role of labor
39
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spokeman. His address at the Mississippi State Federation of Labor convention
later that summer in Gulfport marked the height of his New Deal liberalism:
Mr. President and Fellow Laborers, I think I am justified in putting myself in
your category as a laborer, for, as you know, in these past few years I
have had the distinction of being a Representative in the American
Congress. The duties of that office have been so onorous [sic] and
exacting that if one fulfilled in any substantial part those duties he has
certainly had to labor. The ironical part of it is that while we have been
trying to shorten everybody else's hours that they must labor we have at
the same time been adding to our own. I regret to advise that the much
"cussed" and discussed Wages and Hours Bill exempts Members of
Congress from enjoying its benefits.
As one who began his career as a laborer in a sawmill at the tender
age of 1O years for the magnificent salary of fifty cents a day for twelve
hours work, and as one who has served as janitor of a Ward School in
order to attend High School here in Gulfport, and who subsequently
worked his way through college and has worked ever since for whatever I
may have achieved, I feel at home among you.
The American Federation of Labor . . . is headed by none other
than that slow-thinking, stalwart, true, and tried friend of the man whom we
love to think of as earning his living by the sweat of his brow, one of
America's outstanding citizens occupying a position in America that is
second only possibly to that of the President of the United States himself,
William Green . .. . I am sure it would be interesting to you to know that
some three weeks ago I had the privilege and the pleasure of visiting with
this distinguished man and outstanding citizen for some thirty minutes.
We discussed the problems of Labor. We exchanged views of the
importance of the relationship between employer and employee, between
Government and Labor.
Always having entertained a very high regard for your distinguished
National President, I left his office more convinced than ever that the rights
and the cause of American Labor was in good hands as long as William
Green continued to be at the helm of the Ship of Labor. In this connection
I wonder if may not pardoned if I refer to the fact that Mr. Green took
occasion to personally comment upon the fact that in response to his
suggestion I had voted against the first Wages and Hours Bill and
commended me for voting for the last one. I am happy to say to you that
since I have returned to Mississippi one of the most pleasant incidents that
has come my way has been the receipt of a personal letter of
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commendation and recommendation from William Green upon my
40
legislative record in the Halls of Congress.
The Seventy-fifth Congress adjourned in late June, and Colmer returned
to his district to campaign. Having been in Washington for fifteen of the previous
eighteen months, he anxiously anticipated election season in Mississippi. He
was opposed in 1938 by former ally, R. G. (Dick) Wooten. The ambitious
Wooten boasted to south Mississippi lumber tycoon L. 0. Crosby, "I can render a
real service to my district, my party, and the country," but the skeptical Picayune
businessman attempted to set Wooten straight. "Dick," he asserted, "you do not
have a chance. You will be wasting your time, because Bill Colmer has made a
record for himself and I do not believe there is a man is the district who would
come anywhere near defeating him." Crosby's prediction was accurate. The late
August primary revealed that Colmer had suffered little political backlash from his
controversial wages and hours vote. Instead, District Six's congressman seemed
more popular than ever. Of the 24,000 votes cast in the district, nearly 18,000
went to Colmer.

41

The Fair Labor Standards Act became the New Deal's final landmark
piece of legislation. Throughout 1939 and 1940, the strength of the conservative
coalition in Congress and the distraction of escalating tensions in Europe and the
Pacific prevented further social reform. When Mississippi State Federation of
Labor treasurer J. C. Bullock complained to Colmer that the Seventy-sixth
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Congress had done little to enact more labor reforms that year, Colmer replied,
"The President has requested, and Congress has agreed, not to take up any
matters at this session except the neutrality bill." The war clouds descending on
Washington effectively ended the New Deal. The foreign crisis would dictate
Roosevelt's policies for the next six years, and the nation would soon mobilize for
war.

42

By the end of the decade, Colmer had become one of District Six's most
esteemed residents. "Everybody knows that Bill Colmer is a good
congressman," the Greene County Herald reported in early 1940. "The people of
this district know it, and the men in high places in Washington know it." Colmer's
constituents, like most Americans who had suffered greatly during the
Depression, looked to the federal government for assistance. His votes in
Washington had helped to provide a good deal of it to south Mississippians,
especially the laborers. Despite backing legislation that would lighten their
wallets, he was also able to maintain the support and lasting friendship of
business leaders in the district. 43
Colmer's support for organized labor set him apart from most of his
southern colleagues. The New Deal provided a framework for developing the
weak labor unions that existed in District Six, and the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act all exemplified labor proposals that Colmer believed would lead to better
working conditions. Representing the state's most diverse district compelled
42
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Colmer to endorse legislation that many of his colleagues refused to support, and
from 1933 to 1939, his labor record in the House remained unequaled by few
southerners and no Mississippians. After seven years in Washington, Colmer
had proven himself as both a friend to labor and an ardent New Dealer. In the
summer of 1940, the Laurel Leader-Call reported, "so far as we know, our
representative, Bill Colmer, has no announced opposition to reelection . Nor
should he."44
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CHAPTERV
EPILOGUE
In the early 1940s, as the New Dealers turned their attention from reform
to war, Bill Colmer began a political transition of his own. "You may not believe
it, but I came to Washington as something of a liberal," he commented to a friend
near the end of his congressional career. In 1939, the Roosevelt administration
rewarded Colmer by securing him a position on the powerful House Rules
Committee, the same committee that had buried the wages and hours bill in
three consecutive congressional sessions. In 1945, he was selected chairman of
the House Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, a
prestigious appointment that would send Colmer throughout Europe and the
Middle East to explore foreign trade and economic development. By that time,
1

his transition from liberal to arch conservative had already begun.

As Numan Bartley has noted, the definition of "liberal" would change in the
post-War years. "As racial issues, and most especially segregation in the South,
moved to the top of the agenda for national reform, what had been the nation's
number-one economic problem took on the aspect of the nation's number-one
moral problem," he wrote. Southern Democrats would be forced either to
embrace the changing racial norms, or to abandon liberalism altogether. Like
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most of his colleagues, Colmer chose the latter. The ardent New Dealer
"forswore reform and opted for conservatism."

2

The first step came in 1942 with the split between Colmer and the AFL's
William Green over labor's role in the war effort. Colmer considered the rights of
labor subordinate to winning the war. "I have been preaching for months," he
asserted, "that we must all make sacrifices if we expect to win this war . .. we
cannot win if we insist on keeping all our social reforms and carrying on business
as usual." Months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the CIO and AFL infuriated
many congressmen, including Colmer, by pressing for further labor reforms,
including the continued legality of wartime strikes. Colmer informed the
Mississippi State Federation of Labor that the laboring man "has no more right to
strike against his country when he is engaged in vital defense production than
the soldier or sailor has to desert the colors." When the Bricklayers, Masons,
and Plasterers Union in Gulfport asked Colmer to oppose anti-labor legislation,
he refused. "The question of whether or not we shall survive or become the
slaves of Hitler is the great question before us," he responded. "I am sure that
you agree with me that as your Representative in the Congress I should place
the vested interest of the country in this hour of crisis above everything else."
Colmer's reluctance to support labor in 1942 angered Green, who then endorsed
Colmer's opponent Ben Stevens, in the primary that summer.3
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Additional labor legislation in 1947 underscored Colmer's growing
conservatism, as well as organized labor's continuing difficulties in Mississippi.
The Labor-Management Relations Act, known as Taft-Hartley, represented a
business victory over organized labor. Business leaders in District Six viewed
the act as a much-needed revision of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
and believed managers, not workers, must maintain control of their respective
industries. Many in Congress, including Colmer, supported the bill as a means of
weakening the power of radical labor leaders like John L. Lewis. "As a real friend
of the laboring man, I don't want to see anything done that would destroy the
labor movement," Colmer stressed, but "unfortunately some of our national labor
leaders were drunk with power; and there was a real danger of their pulling the
4

temple down upon the heads of labor."

After the war, the increasing prominence of civil rights within the liberal
agenda accelerated Colmer's political transformation. The racial overtones of
Nazi ideology and Cold War competition for influence in the third world made the
racial status quo in America increasingly unsustainable. Likewise, African
Americans wanted recognition for their services abroad and became more
assertive. As the civil rights initiative became linked to the Democratic Party,
many southerners like Colmer wanted no part. By the 1950s, Colmer had
emerged as a leader within the Southern Bloc, the House delegates opposed to
the civil rights movement, and led the opposition against 1954's Brown v. Board

of Education desegregation decision. During his congressional campaign in
1956, Colmer noted the importance of the election. He stated, "The next two
4

Colmer to H. B. Harrison, June 19, 1947, in Colmer Papers.
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years should determine whether the forces which have set out to destroy the
Southern way of life will prevail." Later that summer, Colmer successfully used
his position as ranking member on the Rules Committee to slow down further
civil rights legislation.5
Colmer's final years in Congress marked the height of his conservatism.
In 1960, he almost lost his position on the Rules Committee when he
campaigned against the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. Only his seniority saved him,
and seven years later, he became chairman of the committee. Colmer used his
position as committee chair to "knife" ideological opponents, as liberal Mississippi
Congressman Frank Smith put it, whenever possible. In 1966, the Memphis

Commercial Appeal declared Colmer "the most conservative former liberal in the
House."6
In March 1972, Colmer announced his plans to retire, despite, he said, "a
strong urge personally, aided and abetted by close friends, to continue my
humble efforts in behalf of sound, conservative government. But, I realize that
there must be an end to all things including my continuation in the Congress." At
Colmer's annual seafood luncheon at the Capitol, President Richard Nixon, the
most conservative president since the New Deal began, announced that a
special White House dinner would be planned to honor Colmer for his years of
5

Robert L. Fleegler, "Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 1938-1947," Journal of
Mississippi History 68 (Spring 2006): 27; Bartley, 95; "Colmer Will Seek Re-election In 6th,, and "Colmer
Slows Down Civil Rights Bill," newspaper clippings in William Colmer file, Series V, Mississippi State AFLCIO Records, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library,
Atlanta.
6
James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963),
77; "Colmer Sure To Make Rules Post Crucial One," newspaper clipping, July 30, 1966, in W illiam Colmer
file, Series V, Mississippi State AFL-CIO Records, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections and Archives,
Georgia State University Library, Atlanta; Dennis J. Mitchell, M ississippi Liberal: A Biography of Frank E.
Smith (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 88.
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service. "Bill Colmer has more guts and courage and determination than most
any man I know," Nixon told the crowd. 7
Reflecting on his long career in Congress, Colmer stated, "My service in
the United States Congress has been an exacting but also a rewarding
experience. It has provided the extraordinary experience of serving in the
administration of six Presidents as well as personal contacts with a number of
world leaders including Sir Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin." Like many
politicians, Colmer left a mixed legacy on Capitol Hill. At times, he bravely stood
alone, and other times he typified the status quo. Ironically, the liberal principles
he fought for in the 1930s paved the way for changes he would detest in later
years. By 1972, Colmer's status as a powerful House conservative underscored
the contrast of his liberal past. More importantly, however, remained factors
outside of his control. Since he had arrived in Washington in 1933, not only had
Bill Colmer changed; so had the definition of liberalism. 8

7

Retirement Statement by Colmer, March 6, 1972; Newspaper article quoting Richard Nixon,
both in Colmer Papers.
8
Retirement Statement by Colmer, M arch 6, 1972, in Colmer Papers.
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